The Economist publishes two thick issues at the end of each December. "The World in ---- [next year]" invariably sucks. But the Christmas double issue is snooty English journalism at its best.
This year, they had a must-read article (subscribers only) on the customary law of the Pushtuns (formerly Pathans), the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, and the source of the Taliban.
Why is it a must-read? Well, I have some legal positivist readers (BKN and Fred S.) who think that law is the command of the sovereign, and it would be good for their souls to read about a longstanding legal system that functions without any sovereign at all. I don't want to spoil the ending, but customary arbitration can be pretty hardcore.
Not to say that all is well. Any paleo-anarcho-libertarian readers would also benefit from reading about how the Pathan clans resolve their disputes -- first by killing each other in nasty ways and, once they have tired of that, by trading their women.
But the most important audience would be the naive democracy promoters. I, for one, would be happy to have the Pathans continue in their folkways. Those folkways are the main obstacle (and main target) of the legalistic and textual Talibs. But those folkways are obviously a million miles from our ideas of human rights. The Taliban, unlike the tribes, are connected into an international jihadist network that would like to kill you and me, gentle reader, so I see some point in fighting them. But we shouldn't get all moralistic about it. The society they are reacting against is just as foreign to us as they are.
Saturday, January 13, 2007
A Disgrace
The US government appears to be asking clients of firms that represent Guantanomo detainees to pressure those firms to drop their representation.
Conservative lawyers in particular have a duty to protest this.
Conservative lawyers in particular have a duty to protest this.
Thursday, January 11, 2007
Wednesday, January 10, 2007
I am Clark, Scourge of Tigray, Hammer of the Oromo
Canadian public policy circles tend to discuss African politics as a backdrop to a familiar argument about a proposed "Duty to Protect". "Internationalists" are all telling us that state sovereignty is completely outmoded and that if Canadians weren't such sorry selfish wusses, we would be spending half the GDP on invading various impoverished places and sorting out their governance and identity issues. Africa is a handy example for them to use, because it indeed has and has had serious problems of predatory states and ethnic-based slaughter.
But what few of us talk about is that Canada's historic role in Africa has frequently been to actively promote predatory states and ethnic-based slaughter. It's at least arguable that the real lesson should be "first, do no harm."
Trudeau and his foreign minister Mitchell Sharp strongly supported the federal government in Nigeria when it starved and bombed Biafra, homeland of the Igbo (the "Jews of Africa"), into submission. Trudeau and Sharp saw the situation in Nigeria as analogous to Quebec secession, and they were prepared to countenance a bit of ethnic massacre to prevent a bad precedent. (Another possibile motive is raised by this report from the BBC. Apparently, the Biafran conflict was an Franco-British proxy conflict, even though such things were no longer supposed to be going on in 1970. Trudeau in 1970 saw France as Canada's major foreign antagonist.)
The Progressive Conservative and NDP opposition protested Trudeau's stand in Biafra. But the most shameful episode was tripartisan. In the mid-eighties, the military-communist government of Ethiopia repeated Stalin's forced collectivization experiment in 1930s Ukraine, with similar results. The Reagan administration was mildly critical. The Trudeau and Mulroney governments -- for different reasons -- saw their African policy as a way of distinguishing themselves from the US.
This led Canada to knowingly finance forced resettlement programs. Disfavoured ethnic groups -- the Oromos in particular (since the Tigrayans and Eritreans could defend themselves) -- were dumped Soviet-style far from their homes with generous assistance from the Canadian taxpayer. Much well-meaning rhetoric about "overpopulated areas" was forthcoming, on the theory that Canadian bureaucrats know better than Ethiopian peasants about what land is overpopulated.
Biafra and the mid-eighties famine in Ethiopia are hardly minor black spots in the recent history of Africa (and our intevention in Somalia didn't work out perfectly either). In both cases, we did something in Africa for reasons that have more to do with our own obsessions than what was going on there. But it will always be thus. Canadian politicians react to Canadian political realities. Even if an intellectual could design the ideal humanitarian intervention in her head, it would never be what was in fact delivered.
Monday, January 08, 2007
Ethioblogging -- A few things I know about the current crisis
I'm not the first to observe it, but there is something liberating about the ignorance on display on the Internet. I don't really know much about the Horn of Africa, for instance: I visited Ethiopia for ten days once, and I know people (both Ethiopian and ex-pat) who know a lot about that country. Which certainly should not be confused with real knowledge. As Sidney and Beatrice Webb demonstrated, no one is as ignorant as the tourist. All I can say for sure from that experience is that the Ethiopian Federal Police look scary and Addis Abbaba has traffic problems that make Istanbul look like Reykjavik. And I wouldn't claim that my more knowledgeable informants are exemplars of dispassionate objectivity.
But in the blogosphere, all expertise is relative. Not everyone willing to share their opinion could distinguish Eritrea from Madagascar. So I feel emboldened. Here are a few points I think are worth bearing in mind.
1. Ethiopia is, at bottom, an old-time Communist country, an ethnic-Leninist party-state.
This isn't something you hear much on the right-wing blogs cheerleading Meles Zenawi, and it is subject to a few caveats, but it's true and important.
The caveats are that the current gang (really the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF), but more politely known as the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)) got rid of a worse bunch of reds, Mengistu's Derg (in 1991), and that they have ruled ever since with a patina of market economics, elections, free expression, federalism and an independent judiciary. At least in the past, there have even been elements of reality to each of these things. But they were always subordinate to the reality of state ownership of land and a democratic-centralist Tigrayan party that would interfere with markets, federalism, judges or elections when it suited them. And since the elections of 2005 -- which the ruling party clearly lost -- there has been a lot less velvet glove and a lot more iron fist.
The best thing that can be said of Meles and his crew is that (at least until recently) they have been nowhere near as bad as a reasonable observer would have expected them to be.
As readers of Lenin and viewers of The Life of Brian will hardly need reminding, communists can be a fractious lot. The Derg (1974-1991) were plain old Brezhnevite commies. As Robert Kaplan (before he went completely nuts) pointed out, they were the first serious commies to take power in Africa. The famine that inspired Band Aid and Live Aid and so on was an exact replica of Lenin and Stalin's politically-induced famines. It was part deliberate civil war tactic and part inevitable consequence of ideolgically-driven collectivization.
The Derg were also Amhara-dominated. The Amhara are an aristocratic-looking people of ancient Christian heritage from the highlands who believe they conquered the other races of Ethiopia fair and square. Their cousins the Tigrayans also think of themselves as born to rule. Marxists Tigrayans (and Eritreans) couldn't look to Moscow for guidance because the Soviets were supporting their Amhara enemies. They also had a falling out with China. So they adopted Enver Hoxha's Albania as the sole socialist motherland. Not encouraging.
However, the TPLF took power in 1991 at a low point for communism of any stripe. Ever since, they have tried (and for the most part succeeded) in being ideal Anglo-American clients. They also realized that the promise of ethnically-based federalism was a good was a good way to get support from all the ethnic groups that hated the Amhara but were suspicious of the similarly Semitic-speaking highlander Tigrayans.
Fortunately for the TPLF, Lenin himself provided a bit of a solution to the trick of being on the Anglo-American good boy list, while remaining red. As all good Trotskyist boys and girls are taught, prior to 1917, Lenin did not think that Russia was ripe for socialist revolution. The next stage had to be a "democratic" revolution getting rid of Tsarism, but leaving capitalism intact. But unlike the more orthodox Mensheviks, he also didn't think that Russian liberal democrats were up to doing this. So he called for a "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" under the firm guidance of a "democratic centralist" Leninist party. The dictatorship would be "democratic" -- not in the conventional sense of being subject to removal by popular vote -- but in its historic tasks of getting rid of the monarchy, landlords and promoting industrial development.
In 1991, Meles figured that Lenin's formula made sense for Ethiopia. Western development experts and Arab, Western and Chinese investment were welcomed. But in all the critical ways, the country remained communist. The neighbourhood cell structure and the Leninst party remained. In contrast to China, land -- obviously the most critical asset in an overwhelmingly agrarian country -- stayed nationalized. But Lenin's formula could be consistent with being buddies with the USA and Britain. Which leads to the next point...
2. Western leaders have an unfortunate need to have African friends.
In terms of pure power, Meles has nothing compared to Bush and Blair. But there is a strong psychological need to think that some African leaders are good guys. Blair needed a leader of a regional African power on his commission, and he'd pissed off Mbeki. And Bush wants to think there are good Third Worlders fighting Islamofascism with him. So we have the US military stregnthening the already fearsome Ethiopian military.
As Wikipedia points out, Meles doesn't lack for "international accolades".
3. The TPLF/EPRDF is past its "best before" date.
You can get somewhere in life being better than your predecessors. And the TPLF/EPRDF were not quite as evil and extreme a bunch as the Derg they got rid of. And even if you dislike them and they are keeping your country poor, it's hard to get rid of well-organized Leninists with a solid base of support among their co-ethnics.
In 2005, the opposition (fractured, naturally, on ethnic lines) got itself together and won the May elections. But the TPLF/EPRDF figured that they came to power through insurrection and civil war, and they were damned if they were going to give that up just because somebody else one an election. So they stole the election, massacred hundreds of unarmed demonstrators and shut down the Amhara opposition press (the English business-orinted media is still allowed polite criticism of the government).
Meles isn't an idiot, and realizes how fractured his country is. He has had to have some continued negotiations with the opposition. But the present situation can't go on forever. Either a full-scale dictatorship is set up, or the opposition (with the support of the diaspora) comes to power.
One thing that could prolong the TPLF/EPRDF's rule would be a security crisis. Widespread jihadi terrorism in the country would be bad for the country, but not necessarily for the regime.
4. Somalis don't like Ethiopians or jihadis
The liberal media is correct that Somalis resent Ethiopia. In the late nineteenth century, Menelik II kicked some Somali butt and many ethnic Somalis live within the borders of Ethiopia. When Haile Selaissie fell to the Derg, Somalia unsuccessfully tried to take advantage of the confusion to win this territory back. The prospect of a Greater Somalia is remote, given the ovewhelming military superiority of Ethiopia. But Somalis don't like highland Semitic-speaking Christian types one bit.
What the last couple weeks revealed is that they may dislike madrassa students even more.
So where does this leave us?
First, the Ethiopian intervention was unjust. International law may permit crossing borders to help the "legitimate" government, even when it has no de facto authority, but any sensible just war theory will reject this legalism. Ethiopia was not aggressed against, and so it had no right to interfere in what type of awful regime Somalia should have.
Second, America's interests (and by extension those of the bourgeois West in general) may or may not be served. The Islamic Courts government might have accepted a deal in which it would keep al Qaeda types out of the country in return for not experiencing what just happened. A chaotic ineffective Somali pseudo-state doesn't have the power to deliver a deal like that.
Third, Meles is a clear winner. He has a more decisive military triumph than he could possibly manage against Eritrea. He has a security rationale for internal crackdown. He has the secure backing of the US.
Fourth, since Meles is a clear winner, the people of Ethiopia are the losers.
Somalis avoid religious tyranny. But they get continued chaos.
Update January 15, 2007: Via Matt Yglesias, I see that the Weekly Standard wants to overthrow the government of Eritrea. Wonderful.
But in the blogosphere, all expertise is relative. Not everyone willing to share their opinion could distinguish Eritrea from Madagascar. So I feel emboldened. Here are a few points I think are worth bearing in mind.
1. Ethiopia is, at bottom, an old-time Communist country, an ethnic-Leninist party-state.
This isn't something you hear much on the right-wing blogs cheerleading Meles Zenawi, and it is subject to a few caveats, but it's true and important.
The caveats are that the current gang (really the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF), but more politely known as the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)) got rid of a worse bunch of reds, Mengistu's Derg (in 1991), and that they have ruled ever since with a patina of market economics, elections, free expression, federalism and an independent judiciary. At least in the past, there have even been elements of reality to each of these things. But they were always subordinate to the reality of state ownership of land and a democratic-centralist Tigrayan party that would interfere with markets, federalism, judges or elections when it suited them. And since the elections of 2005 -- which the ruling party clearly lost -- there has been a lot less velvet glove and a lot more iron fist.
The best thing that can be said of Meles and his crew is that (at least until recently) they have been nowhere near as bad as a reasonable observer would have expected them to be.
As readers of Lenin and viewers of The Life of Brian will hardly need reminding, communists can be a fractious lot. The Derg (1974-1991) were plain old Brezhnevite commies. As Robert Kaplan (before he went completely nuts) pointed out, they were the first serious commies to take power in Africa. The famine that inspired Band Aid and Live Aid and so on was an exact replica of Lenin and Stalin's politically-induced famines. It was part deliberate civil war tactic and part inevitable consequence of ideolgically-driven collectivization.
The Derg were also Amhara-dominated. The Amhara are an aristocratic-looking people of ancient Christian heritage from the highlands who believe they conquered the other races of Ethiopia fair and square. Their cousins the Tigrayans also think of themselves as born to rule. Marxists Tigrayans (and Eritreans) couldn't look to Moscow for guidance because the Soviets were supporting their Amhara enemies. They also had a falling out with China. So they adopted Enver Hoxha's Albania as the sole socialist motherland. Not encouraging.
However, the TPLF took power in 1991 at a low point for communism of any stripe. Ever since, they have tried (and for the most part succeeded) in being ideal Anglo-American clients. They also realized that the promise of ethnically-based federalism was a good was a good way to get support from all the ethnic groups that hated the Amhara but were suspicious of the similarly Semitic-speaking highlander Tigrayans.
Fortunately for the TPLF, Lenin himself provided a bit of a solution to the trick of being on the Anglo-American good boy list, while remaining red. As all good Trotskyist boys and girls are taught, prior to 1917, Lenin did not think that Russia was ripe for socialist revolution. The next stage had to be a "democratic" revolution getting rid of Tsarism, but leaving capitalism intact. But unlike the more orthodox Mensheviks, he also didn't think that Russian liberal democrats were up to doing this. So he called for a "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" under the firm guidance of a "democratic centralist" Leninist party. The dictatorship would be "democratic" -- not in the conventional sense of being subject to removal by popular vote -- but in its historic tasks of getting rid of the monarchy, landlords and promoting industrial development.
In 1991, Meles figured that Lenin's formula made sense for Ethiopia. Western development experts and Arab, Western and Chinese investment were welcomed. But in all the critical ways, the country remained communist. The neighbourhood cell structure and the Leninst party remained. In contrast to China, land -- obviously the most critical asset in an overwhelmingly agrarian country -- stayed nationalized. But Lenin's formula could be consistent with being buddies with the USA and Britain. Which leads to the next point...
2. Western leaders have an unfortunate need to have African friends.
In terms of pure power, Meles has nothing compared to Bush and Blair. But there is a strong psychological need to think that some African leaders are good guys. Blair needed a leader of a regional African power on his commission, and he'd pissed off Mbeki. And Bush wants to think there are good Third Worlders fighting Islamofascism with him. So we have the US military stregnthening the already fearsome Ethiopian military.
As Wikipedia points out, Meles doesn't lack for "international accolades".
3. The TPLF/EPRDF is past its "best before" date.
You can get somewhere in life being better than your predecessors. And the TPLF/EPRDF were not quite as evil and extreme a bunch as the Derg they got rid of. And even if you dislike them and they are keeping your country poor, it's hard to get rid of well-organized Leninists with a solid base of support among their co-ethnics.
In 2005, the opposition (fractured, naturally, on ethnic lines) got itself together and won the May elections. But the TPLF/EPRDF figured that they came to power through insurrection and civil war, and they were damned if they were going to give that up just because somebody else one an election. So they stole the election, massacred hundreds of unarmed demonstrators and shut down the Amhara opposition press (the English business-orinted media is still allowed polite criticism of the government).
Meles isn't an idiot, and realizes how fractured his country is. He has had to have some continued negotiations with the opposition. But the present situation can't go on forever. Either a full-scale dictatorship is set up, or the opposition (with the support of the diaspora) comes to power.
One thing that could prolong the TPLF/EPRDF's rule would be a security crisis. Widespread jihadi terrorism in the country would be bad for the country, but not necessarily for the regime.
4. Somalis don't like Ethiopians or jihadis
The liberal media is correct that Somalis resent Ethiopia. In the late nineteenth century, Menelik II kicked some Somali butt and many ethnic Somalis live within the borders of Ethiopia. When Haile Selaissie fell to the Derg, Somalia unsuccessfully tried to take advantage of the confusion to win this territory back. The prospect of a Greater Somalia is remote, given the ovewhelming military superiority of Ethiopia. But Somalis don't like highland Semitic-speaking Christian types one bit.
What the last couple weeks revealed is that they may dislike madrassa students even more.
So where does this leave us?
First, the Ethiopian intervention was unjust. International law may permit crossing borders to help the "legitimate" government, even when it has no de facto authority, but any sensible just war theory will reject this legalism. Ethiopia was not aggressed against, and so it had no right to interfere in what type of awful regime Somalia should have.
Second, America's interests (and by extension those of the bourgeois West in general) may or may not be served. The Islamic Courts government might have accepted a deal in which it would keep al Qaeda types out of the country in return for not experiencing what just happened. A chaotic ineffective Somali pseudo-state doesn't have the power to deliver a deal like that.
Third, Meles is a clear winner. He has a more decisive military triumph than he could possibly manage against Eritrea. He has a security rationale for internal crackdown. He has the secure backing of the US.
Fourth, since Meles is a clear winner, the people of Ethiopia are the losers.
Somalis avoid religious tyranny. But they get continued chaos.
Update January 15, 2007: Via Matt Yglesias, I see that the Weekly Standard wants to overthrow the government of Eritrea. Wonderful.
Wednesday, January 03, 2007
Federalism and Uniformity: Feature <> Bug
Matt Yglesias complains that federalism doesn't always lead to policy diversity: as he points out, in their remaining areas of jurisdiction, American states often do the same stuff as other American states.
Yglesias's commenters point out that he leaves out a lot of important counter-examples -- the death penalty comes to mind.
But the bigger point is that policy uniformity in matters of provincial/state jurisdiction is the system working as it should. On a lot of issues, the preferences of the median voter will be the same everywhere. On other issues, there are market pressures to do things the way the others do. What Yglesias's point shows is that even when the benefits of uniformity outweigh the benefits of diversity, the lower-level units are likely to deliver it. As a result, one of the main arguments against federalism/for high degrees of centralization is wrong.
The phenomenon of policy convergence demonstrates one of the fallacies of asymmetrical federalism fans. They correctly point out that Quebec is different from the English Canadian provinces in more ways than they are different from each other. But this doesn't mean Quebec needs different powers, just that it is likely to use the same powers differently.
Yglesias's commenters point out that he leaves out a lot of important counter-examples -- the death penalty comes to mind.
But the bigger point is that policy uniformity in matters of provincial/state jurisdiction is the system working as it should. On a lot of issues, the preferences of the median voter will be the same everywhere. On other issues, there are market pressures to do things the way the others do. What Yglesias's point shows is that even when the benefits of uniformity outweigh the benefits of diversity, the lower-level units are likely to deliver it. As a result, one of the main arguments against federalism/for high degrees of centralization is wrong.
The phenomenon of policy convergence demonstrates one of the fallacies of asymmetrical federalism fans. They correctly point out that Quebec is different from the English Canadian provinces in more ways than they are different from each other. But this doesn't mean Quebec needs different powers, just that it is likely to use the same powers differently.
Tuesday, January 02, 2007
Very Silly Person Watch
The intelligent libertarian bloggers have correctly determined that Ann Althouse is a very silly person, and very much not worth talking to.
Pith & Substance has already been on the case, although I can't claim to have devoted as much time to it as these people.
Pith & Substance has already been on the case, although I can't claim to have devoted as much time to it as these people.
I Blame Peter, Paul and Mary
When you have small children, you enter a different culture. One of the features of this culture that seems worse this time around is the plethora of cutesy dragons. Maybe it is specific to boys -- their pajamas seem to have nothing else.The old fart in me wonders how this generation is going to be able to have the same reaction I did when I first read The Hobbit and the fearsome Smaug finally appeared. Dragons are supposed to be scary, but I can't imagine that popular culture has created a sinister dragon since 1959.
It was their scariness -- and therefore misunderstood "otherness" -- that made sense of the friendly dragon theme in the first place. But the self-reflexive parasitical nature of this kind of counter-culture ultimately undermines itself, just like Cardinal Ratzinger said it would. Who's scared of dragons now?
Friday, December 08, 2006
Hiatus
The Pithlord is delighted to announce that he will have new parental responsibilities in the very near future.
Great news, but it means changes around here.
In order to avoid contributing to Canada's burgeoning divorce rate, I'm going to put the blog on hold for a little while.
I'm not going to post at all until at least the New Year. After that, I will see what level of posting I can reasonably keep up.
I appreciate all the support and links, particularly from Matthew Shugart, Scott Lemieux, Daniel Larison and Andy the Ectomorph (a diverse bunch!). Thanks also to Phillipe Landreville, Supreme Court of Canada portrait photographer, for most of the site's visual content.
Google Ad revenues are in the high one figures!
Great news, but it means changes around here.
In order to avoid contributing to Canada's burgeoning divorce rate, I'm going to put the blog on hold for a little while.
I'm not going to post at all until at least the New Year. After that, I will see what level of posting I can reasonably keep up.
I appreciate all the support and links, particularly from Matthew Shugart, Scott Lemieux, Daniel Larison and Andy the Ectomorph (a diverse bunch!). Thanks also to Phillipe Landreville, Supreme Court of Canada portrait photographer, for most of the site's visual content.
Google Ad revenues are in the high one figures!
Thursday, December 07, 2006
Why should he sell your wheat?
Dion is going to bring back the Wheat Board monopoly if and to the extent the Tories undermine it.
One annoying thing about this debate is the presumption that only producers have a legitimate stake in it. Not all wheat is exported, and higher prices for staples is pretty regressive.
It's probably good politics for Dion, though. Liberal support among wheat farmers is zero plus or minus 4% nineteen times out of twenty. However support for the monopoly lines up, getting those votes is still an improvement for the Libs on the status quo.
Wednesday, December 06, 2006
You Can't Say That on Pith & Substance
OK, for the first time, I decided to censor a comment. We have a bit of a free-wheeling discussion here about race, ethnicity and culture -- all hot button issues. I felt a comment went over the line, but I guess that compels me to try to state better where the line is.
The accusation of "racism" or "anti-Semitism" has frequently been used to prevent discussion of things Candians need to discuss. At the same time, taboos exist for a reason and on a private site, even the strongest libertarian would accept I can enforce what I think are necessary taboos.
I am willing to hear arguments that some cultures have strengths and weaknesses that others do not. It is possible that various genetically-based traits are differently distributed among different human populations. Not all religions can be true.
However, I expect people not to engage in setting up their own ethnic group as morally and intrinsically superior to everyone else. I am not going to listen to tales of collective guilt. Ethnic slurs (and other incivilities) are verboten.
As I have previously indicated, this site is not a democracy and there is no right of appeal.
The accusation of "racism" or "anti-Semitism" has frequently been used to prevent discussion of things Candians need to discuss. At the same time, taboos exist for a reason and on a private site, even the strongest libertarian would accept I can enforce what I think are necessary taboos.
I am willing to hear arguments that some cultures have strengths and weaknesses that others do not. It is possible that various genetically-based traits are differently distributed among different human populations. Not all religions can be true.
However, I expect people not to engage in setting up their own ethnic group as morally and intrinsically superior to everyone else. I am not going to listen to tales of collective guilt. Ethnic slurs (and other incivilities) are verboten.
As I have previously indicated, this site is not a democracy and there is no right of appeal.
Tuesday, December 05, 2006
Hindsight, Part II
Fred S. reminds me of this unprescient statement by a certain pseudonymous Canadian lawyer:
Oops. Still two (as yet) unfalsified predictions in that post.
Well, the purpose of bringing in a francophone has generally been to win francophone votes. Since Dion is more unpopular in Quebec than either Rae or Ignatieff, I don't think he is going to get it. I think he's the sentimental favourite, but sentimental favourites don't win.
Oops. Still two (as yet) unfalsified predictions in that post.
Dion Won't Give Up Dual Citizenship
A bit late, the Toronto Star reports that Dion is a dual French/Canadian citizen, and intends to stay that way.
This actually might change my vote. The citizenship relationship ought to be a big deal. The Canadian government has an obligation to protect Canadian citizens, and I think Canadian citizens have correlative obligations of loyalty to the Canadian state. Same with French citizens to the French state (and the French are more serious about this than we are.) Since you can't have dual loyalties, we shouldn't permit dual citizenship.
It's bad enough that we have so many dual citizens in the ordinary population. To have one of them seek to be Prime Minister is too much.
Update: Andy suggests handing Dion over to the French authorities for treason against the Fifth Republic.
This actually might change my vote. The citizenship relationship ought to be a big deal. The Canadian government has an obligation to protect Canadian citizens, and I think Canadian citizens have correlative obligations of loyalty to the Canadian state. Same with French citizens to the French state (and the French are more serious about this than we are.) Since you can't have dual loyalties, we shouldn't permit dual citizenship.
It's bad enough that we have so many dual citizens in the ordinary population. To have one of them seek to be Prime Minister is too much.
Update: Andy suggests handing Dion over to the French authorities for treason against the Fifth Republic.
Monday, December 04, 2006
Hindsight
Andy inspires me to a familiar argument:
My first complaint is about the parenthetical to the subjunctive concession. Whatever the epistemic benefits of hindsight, they are unnecessary for the conclusion that there exists at least one possible world in which the benefit/cost ratio of the invasion of Iraq, net of opportunity costs, is less than unity. What we know now, we could have known then.
The Pithlord wasted a good deal of time in '02-'03 arguing with Iraq War supporters, so everything about that era -- its music, its fashions and its bar debates -- remains impressed on my memory. Two things stand out in particular:
1. Everybody in the whole world (except the Anglophone centre and right) predicted disaster, more-or-less of the kind that occurred. Hippies did. Gaullists did. Andean peasants, Buchananite reactionaries, John Paul II, Al Gore, the career US military, pulp novelists, realist IR professors and pissy arts students all saw this one coming. I know it's kind of embarrassing for the English-speaking right to admit that they didn't have the foreign policy chops of the Berkeley Women Studies' department, but them's the facts.
2. When one argued with Anglophone righties back in the day, one could almost see them twitch with anticipation of being proven right against all of the persons mentioned in point #1 above. Their narratives of Churchill and Reagan were not really attempts to understand the present in light of the past, but the sweet anticipation of being a vindicated minority (albeit one in possession of the world's only military superpower). If Afghanistan's #1 problem right now was a sense of bourgeois ennui, I can't imagine them taking well to talk of "hindsight being 20/20." No, they would demand nothing less than acknowlegment that History had proven them right.
OK, on to less petty points. Andy's claim is that (a) demography is (if present trends continue) going to deal enormous power to the Islamic world that it currently doesn't have, and therefore (b) it is worth taking risks now so that they will be boring pacifists in fifty years.
Point (a) is impossible to refute altogether. But I doubt that we will see an Islamic ascendancy. If you want to worry about civilizational challenges to the West, I'd still bet on China. Having lots of people -- divided by country, confession and ethnicity -- is not power in the contemporary world.
True, you don't need to be a rival civilization to explode a nuclear device in a major Western city. But you don't need a demographic boom to do that either.
Moderate, prosperous and democratic Islamic societies would be nice. Domesticating Islam -- making it more liberal and bourgeois (which, for now, conflicts with making it more democratic) -- is a good thing. But conservatives are supposed to be the people who ask not whether a project is well-intentioned, but whether it will work. Reducing poverty among the working poor is a good thing -- but the minimum wage might not be. Best alternative technology standards for auto emissions may have negative effects if they price out new cars. Could it be possible that ill-thought out attempts to "democratize" a culture North Americans see no reason to try to learn the first thing about could have even worse effects?
To the extent anyone can make anyone else more bourgeois, it is by doing business with them. If we occupy and militarize, then we give power to precisely the undemocratic, extremists forces of anti-prosperity.
Those were just arguments three years ago. Now they are experience.
As for our reputation for the future, every power in the world suffers defeats. Better to suffer smaller ones than bigger ones, so it is better to cut losses now than later. We should fulfill our commitments in Afghanistan. The US should make sure that the Kurds' security is guranteed (it has no other real allies in Iraq). But we should get clarity about what we are fighting for, and what we are not.
Update: Here is a September 2002 paid announcement in the New York Times setting out the realist case against the war. The key bullet point is, "Even if we win easily, we have no plausible exit strategy. Iraq is a deeply divided society that the United States would have to occupy and police for many years to create a viable state."
If you're wondering why we're in Afghanistan or why we (Canadians) should be in Iraq, it is more than anything because we need to counter the notion that all this is feeding on...that the West will risk nothing in defence of its supposed "ideals". Even if one were to concede (in hindsight) that the Iraq invasion wasn't the best thing to do in 2003, it is crucial not to give up now. The establishment, there and in Afghanistan, of moderate, prosperous and democratic Islamic societies is still possible, and one of our last best hopes for a "sustainable" world.
My first complaint is about the parenthetical to the subjunctive concession. Whatever the epistemic benefits of hindsight, they are unnecessary for the conclusion that there exists at least one possible world in which the benefit/cost ratio of the invasion of Iraq, net of opportunity costs, is less than unity. What we know now, we could have known then.
The Pithlord wasted a good deal of time in '02-'03 arguing with Iraq War supporters, so everything about that era -- its music, its fashions and its bar debates -- remains impressed on my memory. Two things stand out in particular:
1. Everybody in the whole world (except the Anglophone centre and right) predicted disaster, more-or-less of the kind that occurred. Hippies did. Gaullists did. Andean peasants, Buchananite reactionaries, John Paul II, Al Gore, the career US military, pulp novelists, realist IR professors and pissy arts students all saw this one coming. I know it's kind of embarrassing for the English-speaking right to admit that they didn't have the foreign policy chops of the Berkeley Women Studies' department, but them's the facts.
2. When one argued with Anglophone righties back in the day, one could almost see them twitch with anticipation of being proven right against all of the persons mentioned in point #1 above. Their narratives of Churchill and Reagan were not really attempts to understand the present in light of the past, but the sweet anticipation of being a vindicated minority (albeit one in possession of the world's only military superpower). If Afghanistan's #1 problem right now was a sense of bourgeois ennui, I can't imagine them taking well to talk of "hindsight being 20/20." No, they would demand nothing less than acknowlegment that History had proven them right.
OK, on to less petty points. Andy's claim is that (a) demography is (if present trends continue) going to deal enormous power to the Islamic world that it currently doesn't have, and therefore (b) it is worth taking risks now so that they will be boring pacifists in fifty years.
Point (a) is impossible to refute altogether. But I doubt that we will see an Islamic ascendancy. If you want to worry about civilizational challenges to the West, I'd still bet on China. Having lots of people -- divided by country, confession and ethnicity -- is not power in the contemporary world.
True, you don't need to be a rival civilization to explode a nuclear device in a major Western city. But you don't need a demographic boom to do that either.
Moderate, prosperous and democratic Islamic societies would be nice. Domesticating Islam -- making it more liberal and bourgeois (which, for now, conflicts with making it more democratic) -- is a good thing. But conservatives are supposed to be the people who ask not whether a project is well-intentioned, but whether it will work. Reducing poverty among the working poor is a good thing -- but the minimum wage might not be. Best alternative technology standards for auto emissions may have negative effects if they price out new cars. Could it be possible that ill-thought out attempts to "democratize" a culture North Americans see no reason to try to learn the first thing about could have even worse effects?
To the extent anyone can make anyone else more bourgeois, it is by doing business with them. If we occupy and militarize, then we give power to precisely the undemocratic, extremists forces of anti-prosperity.
Those were just arguments three years ago. Now they are experience.
As for our reputation for the future, every power in the world suffers defeats. Better to suffer smaller ones than bigger ones, so it is better to cut losses now than later. We should fulfill our commitments in Afghanistan. The US should make sure that the Kurds' security is guranteed (it has no other real allies in Iraq). But we should get clarity about what we are fighting for, and what we are not.
Update: Here is a September 2002 paid announcement in the New York Times setting out the realist case against the war. The key bullet point is, "Even if we win easily, we have no plausible exit strategy. Iraq is a deeply divided society that the United States would have to occupy and police for many years to create a viable state."
Best Federal Program Ever -- Axed
BKN opines:
I'm a bit of a law-and-order type myself, and I think populist complaints of an erratic and overly-lenient sentencing system are vindicated by sound empirical work. But I have to raise an objection to the cancellation of a program giving federal inmates free tatoos. Personally, I can't think of a better investment of public money than providing some easy feature for shaky prosectuion visual ID witnesses.
Seriously though, I'm provisionally impressed by the fact that Dion, unlike his fellow policy-wonk counterpart on the other side of the aisle, seems to believe (as I do) that the state has functions beyond spewing jeep exhaust at brown-skinned foreigners and devising ways to wring a few more drops of vengeance from convicts.
I'm a bit of a law-and-order type myself, and I think populist complaints of an erratic and overly-lenient sentencing system are vindicated by sound empirical work. But I have to raise an objection to the cancellation of a program giving federal inmates free tatoos. Personally, I can't think of a better investment of public money than providing some easy feature for shaky prosectuion visual ID witnesses.
Dion -- Things Could Definitely Be Worse
I am nervous about parties that pick a candidate because he doesn't have the negatives of two more plausible candidates. No doubt the Alberta Tories will survive such things, but the federal Liberals have to exist in a multi-party democracy. We know Dion is a political science professor, has a thin skin, makes Stephen Harper seem like a man of the people, is hard to understand in English and has taken positions that annoy the majority of francophones.
But he got this far. And he has a history of being right (unlike Rae or Ignatieff). I am cautiously optimistic, which is the only kind of optimistic anyone should ever be.
But he got this far. And he has a history of being right (unlike Rae or Ignatieff). I am cautiously optimistic, which is the only kind of optimistic anyone should ever be.
Saturday, December 02, 2006
None of these teams can win
My slightly unfair précis of John Ibbitson's reaction to the Liberal leadership campaign's first ballot results. Somehow, though, somebody has to win.
Note that the calculation of the total number of votes required to win is off. The Liberal Party of Canada can't seem to divide by two. Maybe they are subtly trying to set up an Adscam defence -- no corruption, just bad math skills!
Note that the calculation of the total number of votes required to win is off. The Liberal Party of Canada can't seem to divide by two. Maybe they are subtly trying to set up an Adscam defence -- no corruption, just bad math skills!
Friday, December 01, 2006
Thursday, November 30, 2006
2004: When Iggy was young and foolish, Iggy was young and foolish
Antiwar.com reminds us of this charming quote from Michael Ignatieff in 2004:
Or as Trotsky put it,
Vegetarians, Kantians, priests and Quakers are advised to vote for Rae or Dion.
To defeat evil, we may have to traffic in evils: indefinite detention of suspects, coercive interrogations, targeted assassinations, even pre-emptive war.
Or as Trotsky put it,
As for us, we were never concerned with the Kantian-priestly and vegetarian-Quaker prattle about the 'sacredness of human life.'
Vegetarians, Kantians, priests and Quakers are advised to vote for Rae or Dion.
My kind of redneck
Jim Webb. Bush's lucky Webb didn't wrestle him to the ground.
Update: I sort of meant this as a joke, but via Daniel McCarthy, I see that a source for The Hill is saying Webb actually confessed to a desire to "slug" the Commander in Chief. All I can say is I admire that man's anger management skills.
Update: Scott McConnell has an interesting article about Webb in The American Conservative.
Update: I sort of meant this as a joke, but via Daniel McCarthy, I see that a source for The Hill is saying Webb actually confessed to a desire to "slug" the Commander in Chief. All I can say is I admire that man's anger management skills.
Update: Scott McConnell has an interesting article about Webb in The American Conservative.
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